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The policy recommendations of most economists are based, explicitly or 
implicitly, on the rational actor model of human behavior. Behavior is assumed to be 
self-regarding, preferences are assumed to be stable, and decisions are assumed to be 
unaffected by social context or frame of reference. The related fields of behavioral 
economics, game theory, and neuroscience have confirmed that human behavior is other 
regarding, and that people exhibit systematic patterns of decision-making that are 
“irrational” according to the standard behavioral model. This paper takes the position that 
these “irrational” patterns of behavior are central to human decision making and 
therefore, for economic policies to be effective these behaviors should be the starting 
point. This contention is supported by game theory experiments involving humans, 
closely related primates, and other animals with more limited cognitive ability.  
The policy focus of the paper is global climate change. The research surveyed in 
this paper suggests that the standard economic approach to climate change policy, with its 
almost exclusive emphasis on rational responses to monetary incentives, is seriously 
flawed. In fact, monetary incentives may actually be counter-productive. Humans are 
unique among animal species in their ability to cooperate across cultures, geographical 
space and generations. Tapping into this uniquely human attribute, and understanding 
how cooperation is enforced, holds the key to limiting the potentially calamitous effects 
of global climate change.              
 
JEL Codes:  C7, D6, D7, D8, Q2 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Keynote lecture of the Association 
for Social Economics, ASSA meetings, Chicago, January 4, 2007. The author would like 
to thank the following people for comments on an earlier draft, David George, Gregory 
Graff, Carl McDaniel, Julie Nelson, Richard Norgaard, Inge Røpke, and Martha Starr. 
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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
 
 
I. Introduction   
 
Behavioral research has fundamentally changed the field of economics by putting 
it on an experimental basis (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin, 2004; Gintis, 2006a). The 
axioms of consumer choice—the starting point of traditional economic theory—have 
been re-cast as testable hypotheses and these assumptions have come up short as 
defendable scientific characterizations of human behavior. It is no longer tenable for 
economists to claim that the self-regarding, rational actor
1 model offers a satisfactory 
description of human decision making. Nor do humans consistently act “as if” they obey 
the laws of rational choice theory, as the evidence discussed below shows. The 
implications for economic policy are enormous but have just begun to be explored.  
In its early days behavioral economics revealed various shortcomings of the 
standard model of economic choice. Recently the field has moved from merely reacting 
against the rational actor model to identifying behavioral regularities that might form the 
basis for a new, more realistic model of human decision-making. Experiments such as the 
Ultimatum Game and the Public Goods Game have established a number of regularities 
in human behavior such as loss aversion, habituation, pure altruism, altruistic 
punishment, and hyperbolic discounting of the future. These behavioral patterns have 
been confirmed by neurological experiments showing how behavior is reflected in brain 
activity.  
A shortcoming of much of the behavioral economics literature is that it still 
considers violations of the rational actor model to be “anomalies.” “Irrational” human 
behavior is frequently explained by a kind of tug-of-war between the “rational” part of   3 
the brain, the cerebral cortex, and some other more primitive “emotional” part of the 
brain—“The overriding of deliberation by the influence of visceral factors…” as 
Loewenstein (2004, 691) puts it. The implication is that humans try to act rationally, but 
they are sometimes dragged down by their “animal” instincts. The vast majority of 
evolutionary biologists and neurobiologists reject this view.
2  The emerging view of 
cognition is that the human brain it is a unified, highly evolved system with 
complementary, rather than conflicting, components (Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer 2005). 
Furthermore, it is the “anomalies”—the deviations from the rational actor model—that 
make humans almost unique in the animal kingdom. Ironically, the rational actor model 
seems to be most appropriate for animals with limited cognitive ability and perhaps 
humans making the simplest kinds of choices. For the most important decisions humans 
make, culture, institutions, and give-and-take interactions are critical and should be 
central to any behavioral model.     
This paper argues that the neuroscience of choice can take behavioral economics a 
step further to offer a unified
3 model of decision making that can lay the foundations for 
a science-based policy framework for critical issues involving cross-cultural cooperation 
and inter-generational transfers. Global climate change, one of the greatest challenges our 
species faces, is used as an example of how sustainability policies might be informed by 
contemporary theories of human choice.   
 
II. New insights into human behavior  
One of the most important contributions to behavioral economics was the 
Ultimatum Game
4 (UG) formulated twenty-five years ago by Güth, Schmittberger, and   4 
Schwarz (1982). Like the Prisoner’s Dilemma game before it, the UG helped 
revolutionize the way economists think about economic decision making.
 Results from 
this game as well as from a variety of other game theoretic experiments showed that, in a 
variety of settings and under a variety of assumptions, other-regarding motives are a 
better predictor of behavior than those embodied in Homo economicus. Humans regularly 
exhibit a culturally conditioned sense of fairness and they are willing to enforce cultural 
norms even at economic cost to themselves. Cross-cultural UG experiments also show 
that cultural norms vary and that they dramatically affect the average amount offered in 
the game and the rates of rejection (Henrich et al., 2001). A striking result of numerous 
UG experiments is that the model of rational economic man is not supported in any 
culture studied (Henrich et al., 2001).  
  Also of great relevance to the study of human decision making is a growing body 
of evidence from (non-human) animal experiments. These experiments show two 
important things. First, social animals, such as primates, have a sense of fairness and a 
tendency to cooperate, even at a cost to themselves. Secondly, “lower” animals do appear 
to behave in accordance with the rational actor model. They are self-regarding in 
evaluating payoffs, they are not susceptible to the sunk cost effect, and they apparently 
evaluate payoffs according to expected utility theory. 
The behavior of social animals 
Melis, Hare, and Tomasello (2006) played a cooperation game with chimpanzees 
at the Ngamba Island Chimpanzee sanctuary in Uganda. A feeding platform with two 
metal rings was placed outside a testing room cage with a rope threaded through the rings 
and the two ends of the rope in the test room cage. If the chimpanzee(s) pulled only on   5 
one end of the rope, the rope passed through the rings and the food was not obtained. 
Only if two pulled together could the platform be pulled forward and the food obtained. 
During repeated tests, the chimpanzees were allowed to recruit partners of their own 
choice and they quickly learned to recruit those who were the best collaborators. The 
authors observe: “Therefore, recognizing when collaboration is necessary and 
determining who is the best collaborative partner are skills shared by both chimpanzees 
and humans, so such skills may have been present in their common ancestor before 
humans evolved their own complex forms of collaboration” (Melis, Hare, and Tomasello 
2006, 1297). Kin selection is not involved since the chimpanzees at the sanctuary are 
unrelated orphans from the wild.  
Economists tend to be skeptical of altruistic behavior because such behavior 
because of the “free rider” problem. Self-regarding individuals can out-compete altruists 
by taking advantage of their generosity. As an answer to this objection, Henrich et al. 
(2006, 1767) argue that altruism arose in humans hand-in-hand with punishment. 
Altruistic punishment, or punishing others for violating social norms even at cost to 
oneself, is one way humans deal with free riders and make cooperation work. Apparently, 
punishing those who do not cooperate actually stimulates the same pleasure centers in the 
brain that are activated by, for example, eating something sweet (Vogel 2004, 1131). 
Some evidence indicates that punishing behavior is present in chimpanzees. In one 
experiment semi-wild chimpanzees were fed at a regular time only after all the 
chimpanzees in the compound came to the feeding station. Late-comers held up the 
feeding for all the chimps and these stragglers were punished with hitting and biting.    6 
In terms of standard economic theory, the question is not whether humans (or 
other animals) are selfish or altruistic but whether they are other-regarding. If individuals 
evaluate their payoffs based on what others get, this violates the conditions for Pareto 
optimality in the standard model. Other-regarding behavior may be altruistic, envious or 
any other socially-conditioned response to others. For example, researchers found that in 
cooperation games with an opportunity to punish, subjects from Belarus and Russia 
punished not only defectors but also strong cooperators! (Vogel 2004)   
 
Are”lower” animals more rational than humans? 
 
The view of the human rational actor as a sophisticated decision maker has also 
taken a blow from studies of animals with more limited cognitive ability. Regarding the 
claims for human “rationality”, it is ironic that a large body of evidence suggests that 
“lower” animals act more in accordance with the economic model of rational choice than 
humans do. In a classic experiment, Harper (1982) tested the ability of a flock of ducks to 
achieve a stable Nash equilibrium when fed balls of bread. Every morning two 
researchers would stand on the bank of the pond where the ducks were and throw out 5 
gram dough balls at different intervals. Expected utility theory would predict that the 
ducks would distribute themselves between the two feeders in such as way that, 
N1/r1 = N2/r2, where Ni is the number of ducks and ri is the expected (bread) payoff 
from standing in front of one of the feeders. So if there are 33 ducks participating and if 
one experimenter throws a 5 gram ball of dough every 15 seconds and the other 
experimenter throws a 5 gram ball of dough every 30 seconds, there should be 22 ducks 
in front of the first experimenter and 11 in front of the other. And in fact this is what 
happened. The ducks re-arranged their numbers efficiently as the payoffs were changed.   7 
Furthermore, if the experimenters changed the speed of throwing the dough balls the 
ducks would correctly readjust their numbers with about 90 seconds. Glimscher (2002, 
329) writes:    
One thing that was particularly striking about this result was the speed at which the 
ducks achieved this assortment. After 90 seconds of breadball throwing, as few as 
ten breadballs have been dispersed. Long before half the ducks have obtained even 
a single breadball, they have produced a precise equilibrium solution.  
 
Another well-known behavioral “anomaly” is the sunk cost effect. Ignoring 
unrecoverable past expenditures is one the common admonishments for students learning 
to “think like an economist”, that is to behave in a sophisticated rational way (Frank and 
Bernanke 2004).  But once again, actual human behavior consistently deviates from the 
rational actor model. A number of experiments have demonstrated that human decisions 
are strongly influenced by sunk costs. It appears, however, that ignoring sunk costs is a 
characteristic of the behavior of lower animals, but not humans (Arkes and Ayton 1999). 
Fantino (2004) performed a simple “investing” experiment with college students and 
pigeons. Both were rewarded with money or food for pressing a computer keyboard an 
undetermined number of times until an award was given. Pressing some of the keys 
resulted in an award while pressing others produced no reward. The experiment was 
designed to model a bad investment in which the chances of success diminished as the 
number of responses increased. The more times a key was pressed with no reward 
forthcoming, the less likely further pressing would produce an award. In the experiment, 
the pigeons quickly switched from one key to another if an award failed to appear, while 
the students kept repeatedly pressing the same key—indicating that pigeons were less 
susceptible than students to the sunk cost effect. In another sunk cost experiment   8 
Maestripieri and Alleva (1991) tested the behavior of mother mice in defending their 
young and they found that the aggressiveness defensive behavior depended on the 
number of offspring in the litter, not the amount of time invested in caring for them. 
  The animal behavior literature, together with observations of human behavior, 
suggests that letting sunk costs influence decision-making is a trait that must have 
something to do with human characteristics such as the presence of complex capital 
investments and complex institutions in human societies. It is sometimes argued that 
although individuals may exhibit irrational behavior, such behavior is corrected in groups 
(as in the rational expectations literature). In fact, research shows that groups are 
probably more susceptible to the sunk cost effect than are individuals (Whyte, 2003). 
 
Crowding out by monetary incentives 
 
A growing body of experimental evidence indicates that monetary incentives can 
be a deterrent to cooperative behavior (Frey 1997; Frey and Oberholtzer-Gee 2002). A 
classic example is the result that paying blood donors significantly reduces blood 
donations (Titmus 1971). A recent experiment found that the mere mention of “money” 
had a negative effect on sociality. Vohs, Mead and Goode (2006) performed several 
experiments which compared various kinds of social behavior in groups of people that 
were first given reminders of “money” with groups given a “non-money” reminder. For 
example, in one experiment participants were asked to unscramble jumbled words to 
make phrases. In the money group the phrases involved some concept of money, like “a 
high-paying salary is important.” In the control group the phrases were neutral, like “it is 
cold outside”. This reinforced thinking in terms of money in the experimental group but 
not the control group. The groups were then subjected to nine experiments designed to   9 
test the effects of exposure to money on “self-sufficiency” and helpful behavior. In one 
experiment subjects were given $2 in quarters which they were told was left over from an 
earlier experiment. At the end of the word scrambling game they were offered the chance 
to put money in a box to denote to needy students. Those exposed to reminders of money 
gave substantially less to the charity. In another experiment subjects reminded of money 
were less likely to ask for help in performing a complicated task. In another test, subjects 
were asked to sit at desks and fill out a questionnaire. Some desks faced a poster with a 
picture of money, and others faced a poster showing flowers or a seascape. They were 
then asked to choose between a reward characterized as a “group” or “individual” 
activity, for example, individual cooking lessons versus a dinner for four. Those exposed 
to the money poster were more likely to pick individual activities.  The authors 
summarize the results as follows:  
The results of nine experiments suggest that money brings about a self-sufficient 
orientation in which people prefer to be free of dependency and dependents. 
Reminders of money, relative to nonmoney reminders, led to reduced requests for 
help and reduced helpfulness toward others. Relative to participants primed with 
neutral concepts, participants primed with money preferred to stay alone, work 
alone, and put more physical distance between themselves and a new 
acquaintance…. When reminded of money, people would want to be free from 
dependency and would also prefer that others not depend on them.” (Vohs, Mead, 
and Goode 2006, 1154).         
    
 
Neuroscience confirmation of behavioral “anomalies” 
 
Habituation - It has long been known that two groups of neurons, in the ventral tegmental 
and the substantia nigra pars compacta areas, and the dopamine they release are critical 
for reinforcing certain kinds of behavior (Schultz, 2002; Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, 
2005). Schultz, Dayan and Montague (1997) measured the activity of these neurons while 
thirsty monkeys sat quietly and listen for a tone which was followed by a squirt of fruit   10 
juice into their mouths. After a period of a fixed, steady amount of juice, the amount of 
juice was doubled without warning. The rate of neuron firing went from about 3 per 
second to 80 per second. As this new magnitude of reward was repeated the firing rate 
returned to the baseline rate of 3 firings per second. The opposite happened when the 
reward was reduced without warning. The firing rate dropped dramatically, but then 
returned to the baseline rate of 3 firings per second. 
 
The Framing Effect – Consistency in choice is the hallmark of rational economic man and 
it implies that evaluation of choices will be unaffected by the manner in which the 
choices are framed. This view was challenged by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their 
formulation of “prospect theory”, that is, people evaluate changes in terms of a reference 
point. The “framing effect” means that the frame of references may change according to 
how a particular choice is presented and this will affect the payoff decision. This effect 
has been confirmed in numerous experiments and it too seems to have a neurological 
basis (Miller 2006). De Martino et al. (2006) used functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI)
5 to look at the neurological effects of framing in a simple experiment. A group of 
20 subjects were asked to choose between identical outcomes framed differently. They 
were told first that they would initially receive ₤50. They then had to choose between a 
“sure” option and a “gamble” option. The sure option was presented in two ways, either 
as a gain (say keep ₤20 of the ₤50) or as a loss (say lose ₤30 of the ₤50). The gamble 
option was presented in the same way in both cases—a pie chart showing the probability 
of winning or losing. People responded differently depending on how the question was 
framed and this was reflected in fMRI images. Different parts of the brain lit up 
depending on how the question was framed.   11 
The fact that the framing effect found in this experiment had a neurological basis 
was confirmed:  
Our data provide a neurobiological account of the framing effect, both 
within and across individuals. Increased activation in the amygdale was associated 
with subjects’ tendency to be risk-averse in the Gain frame and risk-seeking in the 
Loss frame, supporting the hypothesis that the framing effect is driven by an affect 
heuristic underwritten by an emotional system. (De Martino et al. 2006, 686)  
 
The neural basis for loss aversion was also confirmed by Tom et al. (2007). They 
found that in order for people to accept a 50-50 gamble the potential gain needs to be 
twice as high as the potential loss. They discovered that the brain regions that evaluated 
potential gains and losses were more sensitive to losses. Also, between-subject 
differences in loss aversion reflected between-subject differences in neural responses. 
These neurological findings may not add anything new to the catalog of behavioral 
patterns observed by behavioral economics, but they do show that they are more than 
“anomalies”. These observed behaviors are not random mistakes but rather are a part of 
our neurological inheritance .     
The Relative Income Effect – Brosnan and de Waal (2003) found that brown 
capuchin monkeys (Cebus paella) exhibit a strong aversion to inequity. In one 
experiment, monkeys rejected rewards for performing a simple task if they witnessed 
another monkey receiving a more desirable reward for performing the same task. Pairs of 
monkeys were trained to exchange a small rock with a human in return for receiving a 
piece of cucumber within 60 seconds. When one monkey saw another receiving a more 
desirable reward (a grape) the monkey would not only refuse to participate in further 
exchanges, they would frequently refuse to eat the cucumber reward, sometimes even 
throwing it toward the human experimenter.            12 
People judge fairness based both on the distribution of gains and on the possible 
alternatives to a given outcome. Capuchin monkeys, too, seem to measure reward 
in relative terms, comparing their own rewards with those available, and their own 
efforts with those of others. (Brosnon and de Waal, 2003, 299) 
 
 
Threshold effects - In a study of how rhesus monkeys respond in a color matching 
experiment, Schall and Thompson (1999) found a correlation between neural firing rates 
and making a physical movement. Thirsty monkeys were trained to stare at a cross in the 
center of a blank display. Then a circle of eight spots were illuminated, seven in one color 
and the eighth in another. If the monkey moved his gaze to look at the “oddball” color he 
was rewarded with a squirt of juice. When the oddball color was identified neural firing 
rates began to increase at the location in the brain encoding the oddball. Only after the 
neural firing rate passes an apparently fixed threshold did the monkey move his gaze. 
Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005) postulate that the decision making brain forms a kind 
of topological map that encodes something like the relative expected gains of each 
possible choice. Actually making a choice (taking an action) depends on the strength of 
the signal relating to that particular action (the neural firing threshold). 
 
Rational Choice and Actual Human Behavior 
The view is widespread that animal behavior justifies the economic rational actor 
model. Gintis (2006b, 7), for example, argues that the assumption of choice consistency 
among humans is justified by animal behavior. “Economic and biological theory thus 
have a natural affinity; the choice consistency on which the rational actor model of 
economic theory depends is rendered plausible by biological evolutionary theory, and the 
optimization techniques pioneered by economic theorists are routinely applied and 
extended by biologists in modeling the behavior of a vast array of organisms.”  Others   13 
take the view that animal studies show that the rational choice model is inappropriate to 
describe all but the simplest kinds of human decision making. Camerer, Loewenstein and 
Prelec (2005, 55) write:  
Our view is that establishing a neural basis for some rational choice 
principles will not necessarily vindicate the approach as widely applied to 
humans…Ironically, rational choice models might therefore be most useful in 
thinking about the simplest kinds of decisions humans and other species make—
involving perceptual tradeoffs, motor movements, foraging for food and so forth—
and prove least useful in thinking about abstract, complex, long-term tradeoffs 
which are the traditional province of economic theory. 
 
For from describing higher-order, complex behavior, the axiomatic rational 
choice model strips away everything that makes humans unique as highly intelligent 
social animals. Nelson (2005, 264) puts it succinctly: 
Defining economics as the study of rational choice, neoclassical economics 
treats human physical bodies, their needs, and their evolved actual psychology of 
thought and action as rather irrelevant. The notion that humans are created as 
rational decision-makers is, from a physical anthropology point of view, just as 
ludicrous as the notion that humans were created on the sixth day.     
 
Our very complex, other-regarding, altruistic, empathetic behavior is what makes humans 
unique, and understanding this behavior is the key to formulating effective economic  
policies having complicated and long-lasting consequences.  
 
III. Is a unified theory of human behavior possible? 
  
One of the great scientific achievements of the twentieth century was the 
unification of the natural sciences—unification in the sense that, although very different 
models are used, the basic understandings of such diverse fields as biology, physics and 
chemistry were made to be compatible (Gintis 2006a). For example, although they 
describe very different processes, the theory of natural selection does not contradict the   14 
laws of thermodynamics. The situation in the social sciences is quite different. Theories 
of individual human behavior held by economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and 
decision scientists are contradictory and incompatible. Gintis (2006a, 2) writes:  
The behavioral sciences all include models of individual human behavior. 
Therefore, these models should be compatible, and indeed, there should be a 
common underlying model, enriched in different ways to meet the particular needs 
of each discipline. Realizing this goal at present cannot be easily attained, since the 
various behavioral disciplines currently have incompatible models. Yet, recent 
theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering 
coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines, as outlined in 
this [Gintis 2006a] paper. The analytical tools deployed in this task incorporate 
core principles from several behavioral disciplines.    
 
Making the economic model of behavior compatible with known facts from other 
behavioral sciences will not be an easy task. As Pesendorfer (2006, 712) points out, 
behavioral economics is largely organized around the failures of standard economics 
rather than being a stand-alone alternative. On the other hand, results from behavioral 
economics, game theory, and neuroscience show clearly that simply modifying the basic 
Homo economicus assumptions will not yield a satisfactory model of human behavior. If 
the self-regarding agent assumption is dropped, the Walrasian system collapses. 
Arguments about what is “rational”, “irrational” or “anomalies” have led nowhere. 
Progress can be made by focusing our attention on observing how and why people make 
choices, identifying consistent patterns in these observed choices, and determining how 
these choices might be predicted (Reiskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers 2006).       
What sort of general framework will contain a consistent theory of human 
decision-making? How can the findings from behavioral economics be placed in a 
framework that would provide policy guidance to sustainability issues? First of all there 
seems to be a movement in philosophy and in economic methodology toward   15 
methodological pragmatism (Bromley 2006, Hodgson 2004, Howarth and Wilson 2006, 
Norgaard 2006, Norton 2005, Searle 2001). Grounding behavioral theories in 
methodological pragmatism allows us to avoid the excesses of both positivist 
reductionism and the morass of post-modern relativism. Economic behavior can be 
understood by observing the actions of actual individual agents and the structural context 
within which they operate.  
There also seems to be a movement toward accepting a single useful operational 
structure to analyze human behavior, namely, generalized Darwinism. The basic idea is 
that social change as well as biological evolution can be understood by applying the 
Darwinian framework of variation, inheritance and selection (Gintis 2006b, Hodgson 
2004, Richerson and Boyd 2005). In Hodgson’s (2004, 450) words: “Darwinism 
combines a general theoretical framework with pointers to historically and context 
specific analysis that is highly relevant for the social sciences.” For economists, this 
involves a conceptual shift from comparative statics to causal, hierarchical, and 
synergistic processes. 
Generalized Darwinism relates to the role of incentives in “selecting” kinds of 
human behavior. The behavioral literature calls into question an over-reliance on price 
incentives as a behavioral selection mechanism. An on-going debate in ecological 
economics and environmental ethics is over the role of prices in environmental protection 
policies. On one hand, there is almost a cottage industry in putting prices on everything 
from biodiversity to scenic views. On the other hand, there is a large literature claiming 
that environmental policy should be based on principles other than market efficiency 
through price signals, for example, appealing to social conscience, ethics, and norms of   16 
fairness (Bromley 2006, Norton 2004, O’Neill and Spash 2000, Sagoff 1988). As 
discussed above, using monetary incentives to promote the social good can have a 
perverse effect. The effect of money is to make people more individualistic and less 
social. Seriously addressing global warming will involve collective, social decision 
making on an unprecedented scale.      
Generalized Darwinism recognizes that patterns of human behavior are selected 
and retained on the basis of their compatibility with approved ways of doing things. At 
any given time, people are rewarded and punished according to how they behave with 
respect to social norms. Of course within any particular society cultural norms vary with 
context and one norm is frequently in conflict with other norms. In market economies, 
accumulating personal wealth is respected but so too is acting charitably. Global warming 
is at present a classic “tragedy of the commons” problem.
6 Climate change policy should 
begin by identifying the incentives for selfish behavior in the “atmospheric commons” 
and then finding ways to minimize incentives for this behavior and maximize those for 
cooperative solutions.   
Another distinguishing characteristic of human thought is that humans can 
perceive the future (Searle 2001). Apes can figure out how to rationally manipulate tools 
to get food immediately but have only a rudimentary ability to plan to get food in a week 
or a month. Our ability to assess the future consequences of present actions, and behave 
accordingly, may be the main hope for preventing catastrophic climate change.  
 
IV. Global climate change  
 
Understanding how humans make decisions and respond to incentives is much 
more than an interesting academic question. It may prove to be the key to the quality of   17 
human existence in the decades and centuries to come. It is likely that responding to rapid 
climate change will be the major challenge our civilization faces in the coming decades. 
Until the 20
th century CO2 levels were under 300 ppm for the past 650,000 million years, 
at least. The pre-fossil fuel era level was about 280 ppm. In 2006 it was 384ppm and with 
business-as-usual it is projected to increase to 600ppm by 2050. CO2 levels could reach 
2000ppm in several centuries if the readily available coal, petroleum and natural gas are 
burned (Kump 2002). Kasting (1998) believes that the most likely scenario is that 
atmospheric CO2 will peak at about 1200ppm sometime in the next century.   
As shown in Table 1 about 4000 gigatons (10
 9 tons) of carbon are stored in the 
atmosphere, forests, soils, and the upper ocean. There is much more in the deep ocean but 
this carbon does not interact with the rest on a timescale relevant to this discussion 
(Kasting 1998). 
 
Table 1. Carbon in the Environment and Carbon Stored as Fossil Fuel 
 
Reservoir                                   Size in gigatons 
 
Atmosphere                                    750 
Forests                                            610 
Soils                                                1580 
Surface Ocean                               1020   
Deep Ocean                                38,100 
  




Coal                                                4000 
Oil                                                     500 
Natural Gas                                     500 
 
Total Fossil Fuel Carbon                                   5000   18 
 
[adapted from Kasting 1998. these numbers are from 1994, need to be updated but the 
basic picture today is the same] 
 
Remarkably, twenty-five percent more carbon than this is stored in fossil fuels (5000 
gigatons). About one-half the carbon released by fossil fuel burning ends up in the 
atmosphere. Deforestation also releases carbon and this activity contributes about one 
third of the human-caused additions to atmospheric CO2.     
As a result of fossil fuel burning and deforestation, the global average surface 
temperature rose by about 0.6C in the twentieth century and the rate of increase appears 
to be accelerating. Global average temperatures are projected to increase by between 1.4 
and 5.8C by 2100 and to continue to rise long after that (Dow and Downing 2006, 37) 
because of the long residence time of CO2 in the atmosphere (more than 100 years). .   
To put this projected temperature change in perspective, one has to go back 55 million 
years to find earth temperatures that high.
7  The probable consequences of global 
warming are well known and include sea level rise, increased droughts and floods, more 
frequent and intense forest fires, more intense storms, agricultural disruption, the spread 
of infectious diseases, and biodiversity loss.  
There is about seven times the amount of currently accessible carbon stored in 
fossil fuels as is now in the atmosphere. The burning of petroleum and natural gas is a 
major problem—there is more carbon stored in these two fuels than there is in the 
atmosphere—but from Table 1 it is clear that the biggest problem is coal. About 80% of 
the world’s fossil fuel carbon reserves are in the form of coal. Known coal reserves 
contain about five times as much carbon as is now in the atmosphere. If a significant 
fraction of these reserves are burned the results will likely be catastrophic. The amount of   19 
carbon stored in coal is so vast that if coal continues to be burned, feasible mitigation 
options will have a negligible effect on stabilizing atmospheric CO2 (Caldeira and 
Kasting 1993). To stay near the bottom of the projected range of global temperature 
increase, global CO2 emissions will have to be quickly reduced to 10-20% of current 
emissions (Shepherd 2006). [Most of the above is this from John Shepherd, Tyndall 
Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Southampton.]   
  Most coal is burned to generate electricity. What are the options for replacing 
this vast and cheap source of energy? Re-forestation can only have a negligible effect 
(Shepherd). Nuclear power is not sufficient because nuclear fuel reserves are limited 
(Kasting 1998). Radioactive waste disposal is still an unsolved problem. Breeder reactors 
are much riskier and more costly. The problem is that alternative sources, including solar 
and conservation will do no good unless these sources replace, not augment, fossil fuels. 
If we are to stabilize the global climate at levels at 2-3C above current temperatures, we 
need to phase out the use of fossil fuels, especially coal. According Socolow et al. (2004), 
to keep atmospheric CO2 at double its pre-industrial level, we need to keep emissions 
under the current level of 7 gigatons until 2054, then a rapid decline after that. If this is 
not done the results will certainly be a very different planet.  If climate stability is the 
goal, we need to begin phasing out fossil fuel use .
8 
Most economists dealing with climate change focus on the rational allocation 
problem, that is, the most efficient way to allocate a given level of carbon emissions. 
Economists have had relatively little to say about how to design policies that would 
enhance international cooperation, or about the economic implications of massively 
substituting non-carbon fuels.
9 The overwhelming problem is how to sharply reduce, then   20 
eliminate, CO2 emissions, not how to theoretically allocate some given amount of carbon 
(Rosen 2006, Socolow 2005).  
 
V. Can behavioral science inform climate change policies? 
 
  The robustness of the findings from behavioral economics led to a growing 
recognition that the model of extreme rationality is of limited value as a predictor of  
human behavior in complex social situations (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005; 
Reiskamp, Busemeyer and Mellers, 2006). The next step is to replace the rational actor 
model of public policy with one that incorporates the regularities of human behavior 
uncovered by behavioral science.
10 How can global warming policies be designed based 
on behavioral science? 
    
Beyond rational choice and optimization – The Walrasian core of economic 
theory gives little guidance as to how to limit fossil fuel use except on the basis of 
preferences as expressed in markets or quasi-market situations (Gowdy 2004a, 2004b). If 
preferences are considered to be “givens” then today’s consumption may trump avoiding 
substantial climate change in the future. The reasoning is something like: “People living 
in the present may value a stable climate in the future but they value today’s lavish 
vacations, larger houses and bigger SUVs more.” The goal of Walrasian policy, based on 
the first two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, is to adjust prices and 
distribution (through lump sum transfers) so as to create the conditions for the nirvana of 
competitive equilibrium. Correcting a specific problem is not the ultimate focus of 
standard economic analysis. The policy focus is on designing allocation frameworks 
based on the duck/pigeon model of human behavior assuming that the optimal social 
outcome is achieved by rational agents responding mechanically to price signals. In this   21 
framework, prices are the incentive for achieving social responsibility. In terms of 
responsibility to future generations, the only policy “choice” is choosing the social rate of 
discount (see for example Dasgupta’s (2006) criticism of the Stern report). Given the 
simplistic assumptions of the model, everything else takes care of itself. 
But global warming is a physical problem involving the interaction between 
physical economic production and the physical characteristics of the atmosphere. 
Adjusting prices based on carbon taxes or cap-and-trade programs to optimally allocate a 
given reduction is really a secondary problem. This is not to say that these policies cannot 
be valuable (see section VI), but economists should have more to say about public policy 
than assigning property rights and adjusting relative prices.
11 The generalized Darwinism 
approach to policy recognizes that macro outcomes are the result of the action of 
individuals responding to behavioral incentives. But it also recognizes that incentives 
include more than prices, that they are culturally conditioned, and that a broadly defined 
incentive structure should be part of pubic policy.       
Beyond monetary incentives – Another major problem with the get-the-prices-
right approach is the body of evidence discussed earlier indicating that financial 
incentives can actually crowd out feelings of civic responsibility (Frey 1997). Monetary 
incentives may actually discourage the kinds of behaviors needed to solve collective 
social problems like global climate change. All environmental problems involve some 
notion of the common good. Behavioral experiments show that the social good can be 
undermined by the mere mention of money. In contrast to the policy recommendations of 
most economists, relying on monetary incentives to tackle collective choice problems like 
global warming can actually have perverse effects. As many environmental philosophers   22 
have argued (Norton 2005; O’Neal 1993) giving people a shared responsibility and 
appealing directly to a sense of the common good is a much more effective way of 
gaining acceptance for environmental policies. 
Is materialistic behavior “natural”? 
During the past 100 years or so consumerism and materialism came to be the 
dominant form of behavior in industrial market societies and this behavioral pattern is 
rapidly sweeping over the entire planet. This behavior is no more “natural” than any other 
of the thousands of behavioral patterns exhibited in human cultures throughout our 
history. Like other cultural patterns consumerism is dominant not because of genes but 
rather because of cultural systems of rewards and punishments. Citizens of industrial 
societies are subjected to hundreds of commercial messages daily. These messages not 
only promote specific products, they also promote a lifestyle based on material 
consumption. The emerging economies of China and India also seem to be locked into 
the model of social status through conspicuous consumption. Although changing this 
model may seem hopeless, it is important to remember the malleability of human 
behavior. It is easy to imagine new ways of living with different systems of rewards and 
punishment promoting more environmentally (and socially) benign ways of status 
seeking.    
Tipping points and threshold effects  - As discussed earlier threshold effects have 
been identified in the brain activity of individual animals making motor decisions. 
Threshold effects have also been identified in collective decision-making in social 
animals. For example, spinner dolphins spend most of their time either feeding or 
sleeping in a protected area—behind a coral reef for example. The decision to quit   23 
sleeping and leave the protected area to feed is apparently collectively made based on a 
kind of “voting” threshold. When they begin to wake up, the dolphins use zigzag 
swimming motions to cast their “votes” for sleeping or feeding. When a threshold is 
reached the dolphins as a group leave the safe area and go to feed in the danger of the 
deep ocean (Whitty 2006, 40). This kind of group coordination—with different kinds of 
threshold consensus—is common among social animals from crows to chimpanzees to 
bison. Group consensus was apparently how important decisions were made in human 
groups prior to agriculture judging from historical accounts of hunter-gatherers (see the 
essays in Gowdy 1998).   
The climate change challenge is unique compared to other challenges we face 
since it involves changing the organizing principle of the industrial economy—abundant 
and cheap energy. Is there a threshold, or tipping point, that would trigger the consensus 
and political will to seriously attack the causes of climate change? Will there be a tipping 
point in climate change that will lead to collective action mitigating the danger of 
catastrophic change?  
 
VI. Addressing climate change: A policy sketch 
 
  The behavioral model of rational economic man has dominated economic theory 
and policy for one hundred years or more. Behavioral economics has come of age only in 
the last decade or so and it is too early to expect a full-blown policy agenda from it. 
However, broad and general patterns of behavior have been identified and these patterns 
offer clues for global warming policy. 
Policy Clue Number 1: Increasing consumption does not translate into increasing social 
well-being.   24 
Climate change is driven by increasing fossil fuel consumption used to produce an ever 
larger amount of consumer goods. Numerous studies have demonstrated that, past a 
certain point, increasing per capita income does not increase well-being. The implication 
is that slowing or halting per capita income growth need not reduce social welfare. This is 
a very important starting point since the drastic reduction in fossil fuel use required to 
stabilize the climate will certainly mean a reduction in the production of consumer goods. 
A number of economists call for a re-orientation of welfare policy goals from “income” 
to “well-being”. This applies not only to the developed world (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; 
Kahneman and Sugden, 2005; Layard, 2005) but also to the developing world.  
Policy Sub-Clue Number 1a: Absolute income may not be correlated with well-being but 
relative income is. 
People are very concerned about their relative position in society and this concern 
may drive patterns of consumption (Frank, 1999; Veblen, 1898). This implies that 
policies to reduce consumption must be carefully formulated to minimize the 
redistribution effects. This need not mean an order-preserving reduction in income but 
the relative losers in consumption reduction should be compensated in some way to 
minimize the relative income loss. The wealthy for example, could be rewarded with 
some sort of public recognition of their sacrifice for the common good. People are more 
inclined to give to public goods when they can be observed to do so and this should be 
incorporated into climate change policy. 
Policy Sub-Clue Number 1b: Development need not focus exclusively on  increasing per 
capita consumption   25 
“Development” in the third world need not follow the path of the industrialized 
nation during the twentieth century. Sen (1999) has called for an approach to 
development emphasizing the ability to live an informed and full life rather than 
concentrating solely on income creation. Nussbaum (2000, chapter 4 and website of 
Human Development and Capabilities Association) has gone even further in calling for 
“distributive justice” creating the conditions for the realization of a set of central human 
capabilities. Such policies would not only be more effective than simple income growth 
in making lives better in the third world, they would also help alleviate the pressure on 
the atmosphere from more economic production. With a focus on individual happiness 
and self-actualization, the developing world could improve its position relative to the 
North without emulating the consumption frenzy that drove past economic growth.   
Policy Clue Number 2: The ability to cooperate with unrelated others is an almost unique 
characteristic of the human species. 
Humans and other closely related primates cooperate on a scale not present in any 
other mammalian species. Recent evidence indicates that this cooperation goes beyond 
traditional explanations based on kinship and tit-for-tat reciprocity (De Waal, 1996; 
Field, 2003; Vogel, 2004; Sober and Wilson, 1998). For most of our existence as a 
species we live in small groups in hostile environments where cooperation was essential 
for survival. Groups of people that cooperated were able to out-compete those who did 
not (Gowdy and Seidl 2004; Sober and Wilson 1998). Successfully dealing with global 
climate may require cooperation on an unprecedented scale among people with radically 
different values and radically different needs. Formulating policies that tap into our social 
and genetic heritage of cooperation offers the best hope for success.      26 
Policy Sub-Clue Number 2a: Cooperation depends on the ability to punish free-riders  
Boyd and Richerson (1992) argue convincingly that almost any type of human 
behavior can be called forth through social punishment mechanisms. Henrich (2006) 
argues further that cooperation and punishment go hand in hand. People are willing to 
make sacrifices for others when they are assured that others (free riders) can be punished 
if they take advantage of altruistic behavior. Henrich et al. (2006) present cross-cultural 
results from 15 diverse populations indicating (1) all populations showed a willingness to 
punish free riders, (2) the amount of punishment varied considerably across the groups 
studies, and (3) costly punishment was positively correlated with altruistic behavior. 
These and other game theoretic experiments are invaluable in informing climate change 
policy.        
Stiglitz (2006) calls for using the international trade framework to impose 
penalties on countries (like the U.S. under the Bush administration) that refuse to 
cooperate in reducing CO2 emissions. He suggests that Japan, Europe and other 
signatories of the Kyoto agreement should bring a WTO case against the U.S. for unfair 
trade subsidization arising from U.S. energy and environmental policies. “With a strong 
international sanction mechanism in place, all could rest assured that there was, at last, a 
level playing field” (Stiglitz 2006, 2-3). 
Policy Sub-Clue Number 2b: The question of fairness 
  A major issue in global climate change policy is the fairness of the policy with 
respect to developing countries. The undeniable fact is that we have reached a tipping 
point in global climate change because the industrialized world has pushed CO2 levels 
from 280ppm to 380ppm in the last hundred years. The North has gotten rich by burning   27 
fossil fuels and now we are telling the poor countries to stop this practice. Stiglitz 
suggests that a fair way out of this dilemma is a common (global) carbon tax on 
emissions. He suggests that the tax revenue be kept by each individual country and used 
to reduce taxes on capital and labor. A more radical idea is to put the revenues in a 
common pool that could be used for such things as education, health, and alternative 
energy projects. Most of this money could go to the world’s poor countries both in the 
interest of fairness and the practical need for these countries to avoid the path of energy 
extravagance followed by the North. 
  Frey (1997) argues that monetary incentives can crowd out civic motives, but he 
also acknowledges that money can “crowd in” civic motivations when it is used to 
acknowledge the social worth of individuals’ contributions. This is relevant to channeling 
financial aid to ease the climate change burden on the developing world. Monetary 
compensation and technology transfers to the developing world would represent an 
acknowledgement of the responsibility of the developing world for driving up CO2 levels 
during the past 100 years.   
 Policy Sub-Clue Number 2c: Real world cooperation depends on the specific context 
  Humans may be unique among mammals in the extent to which they cooperate 
with others. But it is also true that humans are almost unique in the extent to which they 
willing to annihilate members of their own species that do not belong to the “in” group. 
Experiments and observation show that people are more willing to cooperate with “like” 
others than with outgroup persons. There is a growing interest in the nature of social 
cohesion and its implications for the rise and fall of whole societies (see for example,   28 
Turchin 2005).  Much more research is needed in this area with an eye toward policy 
implications.         
VII. Conclusion 
 
The current crisis of sustainability cannot be resolved within the confines of the 
system that generated it. For economic analysis this means stepping outside the 
Walrasian system with its emphasis on one part of human nature (greed and egoism) to 
the neglect of other the facets of human nature (cooperation, altruism). This is critically 
important at this stage in the development of economic thought. The mechanistic 
worldview has collapsed, biology has replaced physics as the field of inspiration for the 
philosophy of science, and the unification of the social sciences is well underway.  
For social policy, leaving the confines of the current system means drawing upon 
aspects of human nature emphasizing cooperation, non-material social values, and a 
shared sense of urgency. Given the overwhelming dominance of the consumption-as-
happiness ethic in our culture, the task of finding less materialistic path seems daunting. 
But greed and accumulation are only a part of the richness of human behavioral patterns. 
These have come to prominence because they have been rewarded through an incentive 
structure that grew hand in hand with the production bonanza made possible by fossil 
fuels. Types of behavior conducive to cooperation, doing with fewer material 
possessions, and recognizing the necessity of shared sacrifice are also part of the human 
experience.       
Global climate change is perhaps the most serious threat every faced by our 
species (David Attenborough, E.O. Wilson etc.). Even stabilizing future warming of the 
earth at 2-3C above its present temperature will require monumental efforts (Socolow   29 
2005). The marginal approach of traditional economic analysis, with its near exclusive 
emphasis on prices and property rights, is not up the task of sufficiently changing 
individual behavior and the structure of economic production. In fact, the task of meeting 
the climate change challenge may prove to be impossible. But behavioral science at least 
offers a more far-reaching and realistic approach to designing policies that might get us 
through this impending crisis.     
   30 
End Notes 
 
1. The fact that the field of economics is changing so rapidly means that terms that were 
once good descriptions of basic concepts are no longer adequate. I use the term “rational 
actor” to describe to kind of behavior also attributed to Homo economicus or economic 
man, rational choice theory, the canonical model (Henrich et al. 2001), or the axioms of 
consumer choice, among others. Gintis (xx) also uses the term rational actor but in a way 
so as to include a much wider array of human behaviors than the once standard economic 
model. The term “Walrasian” will be used to describe the general equilibrium system  
of traditional economics with its key assumptions of rational actors and competitive 
equilibrium. 
 
2. Referring to the idea of economists that “irrational” behavior is the product of ancient 
emotional systems within the brain, Glimcher, Dorris, and Bayer (2005, 252) write: 
“What we cannot stress strongly enough is that the vast majority of evolutionary 
biologists and neurobiologists reject this view. There are probably two principle reasons 
that biologists reject this dualist view of the nervous system; one neurobiological and one 
behavioral. First there is no neurobiological evidence that emotional and non-emotional 
systems are fully distinct in the architecture of the human brain. Second there is no 
evidence that rational and irrational behaviors are the products of two distinct brain 
systems, one of which is uniquely rational and one of which is uniquely rational.” 
 
3. Some reviewers objected to the notion of a “unified model” of human behavior. I use 
the term only to mean that the various kinds of models used by economists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, decision scientists, etc. should not be flatly contradictory as they are 
now. This does not contradict, for example, Norgaard’s (1989, 2006) notion of 
“methodological pluralism.” But it does mean weeding out, using the scientific method 
where possible, those theories falsified by empirical evidence.     
 
4. In the Ultimatum Game a leader offers one of two participants a certain sum of money 
and instructs that participant to share it with the second player. The second player can 
either accept the offer or reject it in which case neither player gets anything. Homo 
economicus should accept any positive offer. Results from the game show, however, that 
the majority of proposers in Western countries offer between 40 and 50% of the total and 
that offers under 30% of the total are usually rejected because they are not “fair” (Nowak, 
Page and Sigmund, 2000). These results have held up even when played with substantial 
amounts of real money (Gowdy, Iorgulescu, and Onyeiwu, 2003). 
 
5. It should be pointed out that fMRI techniques measure blood flow and oxygen 
consumption rather than neural firings and the resolution is rather poor.  
 
6. Garrett Hardin’s classic 1968 paper continues to provide insights into the problem of 
free riding and common property resources, but has not held up well in light of 
behavioral economics, evolutionary psychology and game theory. “Common” property 
was actually well-regulated in traditional societies to prevent over use. Concessions to the   31 
common good are part of our evolutionary heritage and if enforced by effective 
punishment can mitigate the free riding problem.   
 
7. During the Late Pleistocene Thermal Maximum the earth’s average temperature rose 
by about 7C. This sudden temperature rise lasted for about 150,000 and was triggered by 
a massive release of methane from the ocean floor (NASA news archive, December 10, 
2001). 
 
8. Realistically, it must be admitted that the prospects of doing this are bleak. With China 
and India industrializing, Carbon emissions are rising faster than ever. Annual carbon 
emission grew by about 0.8% from 1990 to 1999. From 2000 to 2005 they grew by 3.2% 
or four times faster (Brahic 2006). China has plans to build 562 coal fired power plants in 
the next 8 years, India plans to build 213 and the U.S. 72 (Clayton 2004).  
 
9. For critiques of economic models of climate change see Gowdy (2004b), Laitner, 
Decanio and Peters (2001), and Spash (2002).  
 
10. Economists using evidence from behavioral economics to suggest a redirection of 
public policy include Layard 2005, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Kahneman and Sugden 2005, 
Ng 1987, 1997 and Frank 1999. Very practical examples of using behavioral 
understandings to inform policy include the design of savings plans (Benartzi and Thaler 
(2004), encouraging fertilizer adoption in Kenya (Duffo, Kremer and Roberinson 2005), 
and improving the reliability of identifications in police lineups (Wells et al. 2000).  
 
11. Rosen (2006) points out that the U.S. generates about 5.5 times the world’s average 
amount of carbon per capita. To do our part in achieving a 50% reduction, and taking 
equity into account, the U.S. would have to cut carbon emissions by a factor of 11 (1/2 
times 1/5.5). This would be a 91 percent reduction. A carbon tax high enough to achieve 
this cutback would amount to $100 or more per ton and would most likely be 
economically catastrophic. A smaller carbon tax would get us part of the way toward 
stabilizing CO2 levels but numerous other policies would be required.   32 
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